Water Conservation Technology: The Adoption Response to Incentives by Osgood, Daniel E.
 34
WATER CONSERVATION TECHNOLOGY:  THE ADOPTION 
RESPONSE TO INCENTIVES 
 
Daniel E. Osgood 
University of Arizona 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Water use in agriculture depends heavily on the 
adoption of efficient irrigation technologies. It is 
therefore essential to provide incentives for the 
adoption of these technologies in arid regions. In real 
world applications, this task is complicated by missing 
markets and restrictions on policy tools. Often, property 
rights are not well established for water and regulatory 
agencies do not have the mandate to set appropriate 
prices or fees.   In addition, precision conservation 
technologies are information intensive.  This feature of 
production reduces efficiency through the market 
failures associated with the public good properties of 
information. However, it also provides regulators with a 
new, surprisingly successful policy tool, the provision 
of information. This paper uses the public good 
properties of information and the nature of precision 
irrigation technologies to explain the unanticipated 
success of information based program in California and 
its relationship to other incentives in encouraging the 
adoption of conservation irrigation technologies.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
In arid regions such as California agricultural, 
environmental, and municipal users compete fiercely for 
scarce water resources.  Approximately 80 percent of 
California’s water is supplied to a 20 billion dollar 
irrigated agricultural industry (Parker, 1997).  If urban 
landscaping, golf courses, and parks are included, the 
share of water applied by irrigation is even greater, as is 
the commercial value of its use.  Since water 
consumption depends heavily on the irrigation 
technology used, the adoption of water efficient 
precision irrigation systems is critical (Khanna & 
Zilberman, 1997).  
 
In the most naive analysis, the incentives necessary to 
encourage the appropriate adoption levels are 
straightforward: Ensure that water users pay a price for 
water that is equal to its true shadow value. Not 
surprisingly, the practical situation in California is too 
complicated for the direct application of this principal. 
Water supply and regulatory agencies are limited in 
what fees they can charge. Uncertainty in water rights 
hinders efficient markets, as do regulations restricting 
trades.    
 
In addition, conservation oriented irrigation 
technologies can be highly information intensive, which 
means that information related issues must be 
understood for appropriate management. In fact, 
adoption incentives based on public weather 
information provision in California have demonstrated 
an unanticipated level of success. This paper discusses 
the factors behind the successes and weaknesses of 
information programs and how they are linked to water 
pricing in providing incentives for adoption of 
conservation irrigation technologies.  
 
MARKETS AND FAILURES  
 
It is important to be aware of the scope and limitations of 
real world price incentives as they are manifested in 
California since market perversities can lead to 
incentives for inefficient water use.  
 
Wholesale agricultural surface water delivery in 
California is primarily performed by two agencies, the 
California Department of Water Resources (DWR), and 
the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR).  Both 
of these agencies are required to price the water 
delivered based on the cost of repaying the bonds 
issued to build and operate the conveyance and storage 
facilities.  This requirement prevents them from charging 
the scarcity value of water or from applying fees to 
encourage conservation.   
 
The types of pricing schemes offered reflect the focus 
on bond repayment. Often, customers do not even pay 
marginal prices for water deliveries, instead having an 
annual fixed allocation that they purchase in bulk, which 
is based on acreage owned. The power to provide 
market-based incentives has another restriction: The 
USBR is required to allocate property rights based on 
reasonable grower needs, or beneficial use.  In this “use 
it or lose it” framework, a grower has a disincentive to 
adopt conservation technologies since that could result 
in proving that the grower has lower water needs and 
lead to a reduction in water allocated. Water markets are 
impossible under this allocation of property rights since 
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any water the grower has to sell would demonstrate that 
grower was getting more water than needed.  
 
Although there is limited flexibility in USBR policy, 
redefinitions have been made in an attempt to reduce the 
disincentive for conservation.  First, it is now possible to 
classify conservation as beneficial use.  However, this is 
based on mechanistic top down calculations that do not 
easily allow for individual innovation and flexibility. 
Second, certain water trades can be classified as 
beneficial use, allowing the establishment of limited 
water markets. Although these redefinitions do move the 
water policy of the USBR in the direction of 
conservation oriented incentives, they also demonstrate 
the restrictive framework that agencies such as the 
USBR and DWR must work within.  
 
The limitations in USBR pricing policy reflect 
California’s long history of uncertainty in water rights.  
There have been two competing water rights doctrines, 
appropriative and riparian.  Claims made under one 
system were challenged under the other system, leading 
to a century of litigation.  In recent years rights have 
become relatively well established. The legacy of 
uncertainty is still evident, however. In periods of water 
scarcity, or when new species are listed as endangered, 
the water rights of cities and agriculture are threatened. 
In addition, since water trading is a relatively new 
phenomenon in California, there is sometimes a public 
perception that growers should not have the right to 
make “too much” money from selling water, since the 
state owned water is supplied to them at delivery cost 
by government agencies, and is based on redefinitions 
of beneficial use. Perceptions of profiteering can lead to 
extensive scrutiny of trades, increasing their costs and 
perhaps weakening the water rights of the participants.    
 
The politics of solidifying rights drives many of the 
positions held by water users in negotiations. Privacy is 
highly valued since public outcry can lead to lawsuits 
threatening water rights.  Supporting water markets can 
be viewed as a signal that a stakeholder is obtaining 
“more water than they need,” so even if a party stands 
to benefit significantly from the market, it may be in that 
party's interest to publicly voice reservations about the 
market. Similarly, if growers must establish that they 
deserve the water allocations that they receive, they may 
resist conservation programs that can imply that they 
have not been using their water efficiently in the past.  
 
Other restrictions on water trading exist.  For example, 
trades between different sectors (for example from 
agricultural to urban) require special approval, which can 
be expensive and take a great deal of time. As a result, 
successful ongoing markets have been constrained to 
be within agricultural sectors with intersectoral trades 
restricted to costly, repeated negotiations between 
cities, agriculture, and environmentalists for each 
individual transaction.  
 
Daily ongoing water markets operate in the Westlands 
agricultural water district.  Another market exists 
between agricultural water districts within the San Luis 
Delta Mendota Water Authority (Olmstead et al., 1997).  
Because these markets function entirely within the same 
delivery agencies, and represent entirely agricultural 
uses they have been able to circumvent many of the 
obstacles that broader markets would face.  Of course, 
this limits the benefits of the trades.  Nevertheless, 
almost half of the water used by Westlands district 
flows through the market (Olmstead, 1998).  
 
USBR sponsored trades to bring water to environmental 
uses are being debated in the inter-district water market.  
These are politically sensitive, not only for the reasons 
already mentioned but also because the funding for 
these trades is assessed from the water districts.  Some 
water districts have demonstrated sentiment that they 
should not have to bid against fees already paid to the 
USBR when purchasing water. Nevertheless, given 
enough time and the continued solidification of water 
rights, these barriers to trade may ease.   
 
In the meantime, however, water delivery agencies have 
an extremely limited ability to use water prices to 
encourage the efficient use of water.  Since markets are 
limited and costly and agency pricing cannot be set 
based on scarcity, these agencies have been forced to 
look to other mechanisms to promote conservation.  
 
 
IMPACTS OF A WEATHER INFORMATION 
PROGRAM  
 
 
In an attempt to encourage water conservation in 
agriculture given their severe restrictions on pricing 
incentives, the DWR instituted the California Irrigation 
Management Information System (CIMIS) in 1982.  The 
CIMIS network consists of 111 weather stations across 
the state providing a wide range of weather related 
measurements to growers. The principal data product is 
daily regional evapotranspiration (ET). Originally, the 
information was provided free of cost to subscribers 
through dedicated modem lines. University of California 
extension supplemented the weather information with 
detailed instructions on how to take advantage of the 
raw data for irrigation of particular crops. It was hoped 
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that growers could reduce water wasted in irrigation if 
they had better information on daily impacts of weather 
on crop water use.  
 
In a tight state budget environment, questions about the 
performance of the program led to in inquiry about its 
effectiveness.  Concerns about the scope of the program 
arose because a relatively small group of growers were 
the principal users of the system. Irrigation consultants 
were also significant users of the system, reselling value 
added products to growers. This motivated policy 
makers to question if ET provision was an appropriate 
role for the government or if the system should be 
privatized or fee based. As the system evolved, 
newspapers became clients and CIMIS ET data began to 
print in the weather section. With this, questions arose 
about how to prevent the spread of the information if a 
fee were to be charged.  
 
To address these concerns, the University of California 
performed a study of the CIMIS system to compare its 
costs and benefits in terms of water savings and 
production increases.  Unanticipated impacts of the 
system were also investigated, as was its potential for 
privatization or funding through user fees.  This study 
(Parker et al., 1996) estimated that the CIMIS saved 
approximately one hundred thousand acre feet of water 
per year in agriculture. These savings were not only for 
growers supplied by the DWR, but also for those who 
got their water from the USBR or other sources. In 
addition, growers using CIMIS reported increased yields 
in spite of their water reductions.    
 
The intensive users of the system provided most of the 
water savings and reaped most of the benefits.  
Although this was a relatively small group, the benefits 
and water savings they experienced provided 
substantial statewide impact. The combined net profits 
to growers resulting from the water cost savings and 
increased revenues from yields were estimated to be 32 
million dollars annually. This was significantly more than 
the eight hundred thousand dollar annual budget of the 
program.   
 
These users tended to face high water costs, have fast 
draining soils, and high value crops. Irrigation 
technology effected benefits as well. Most of the 
intensive users of the program used pressurized 
irrigation systems. A minority among the intensive 
users, growers with nonpressurized irrigation systems 
such as flood and furrow, experienced about a 5 percent 
in water savings while growers using drip and sprinkler 
systems experienced savings of about 15 percent. In the 
interviews many growers reported that they switched to 
drip or sprinkler systems in response to the availability 
of the CIMIS program.  
 
The report found that it would be difficult to privatize or 
charge fees for the CIMIS information. Growers could 
share the information almost costlessly. Thus, to a 
certain extent the weather information had public good 
characteristics. Although private consultants were 
providing weather information to growers for a fee, they 
were developing value added, individually tailored 
products.  Because these products were specific to 
individual growers, the problem of the costless spread or 
pirating of the information was not an issue for a value 
added product. An interesting pattern of provision of 
public information to private users was noticed.  The 
CIMIS system was used for the more public component 
of the information while individual consultants stepped 
in to provide the private part, usually using the CIMIS 
system as an initial starting point for their work. The 
potential for “pirating” the information was a significant 
deterrent preventing privatization of the core weather 
product or funding it through fees.  
 
Many unanticipated uses were discovered for the 
weather information. Growers were finding that they 
could use it to increase the quality of their crops, for 
example, by optimally stressing wine grapes or 
preventing melons from rotting in standing water.  The 
reductions in standing water were also beneficial for 
pest control, reducing pesticide use and associated 
costs (Daane et al., 1995).  Making use of the entire set 
of weather variables, growers were able to predict pest 
outbreaks and reduce pesticide applications to those 
particular situations.  
 
As Internet use became more widespread, CIMIS 
information was made available in that form. Since the 
weather information could be used by groups outside of 
the jurisdiction of the DWR, these groups were able to 
develop methods to take advantage of the system, 
providing unanticipated water savings. Much like the 
Internet itself, the availability of the weather program 
encouraged innovations for unexpected uses as clients 
discovered ways in which the system could benefit 
them. These users included fire control districts and city 
and county planners.  Because of the high price of urban 
water and high value for the quality of their amenities, 
urban landscaping and golf courses were among the 
most intensive users of the system and had the highest 
rates of water savings and benefits from the system. 
Even though these groups were far outside of the 
pricing mandate that the DWR had, their water use was 
heavily impacted by its information program.  
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Although it is clear how an information system can 
provide benefits to unanticipated groups, the reasons 
for the other results observed are not necessarily so 
evident.  This paper proceeds to explain the link between 
weather information and agricultural production, why 
growers choose to use the program, how is it possible to 
simultaneously achieve water savings and yield 
increases, and perhaps most importantly, how 
information interacts with other incentives.  
 
ADOPTION, PRECISION, AND INFORMATION  
 
The literature on precision technologies demonstrates 
how water use is related to irrigation technology choice 
and why efficient irrigation systems require quality 
information in order to be effective.  In this literature, 
waste in irrigation systems arises from growers being 
constrained to a uniform application of water when 
actual crop water consumption vary from day to day. 
Hot windy days dry out crops more than cool moist 
days.  
 
To quantify weather effects on water demands, irrigation 
engineers use daily evapotranspiration or ET (Snyder et 
al., 1981).  ET is the volume of water that evaporates 
from and transpires through a crop in a day due to that 
day's weather. If an inflexible irrigation system prevents 
a grower from adjusting to the water demands of 
different days, that grower is forced to decide on the 
compromise homogenous application level.   On days 
with low ET, the compromise amount applied is too 
much water and the excess deep percolates or drains off 
the field to be wasted.   On days with a high ET, the 
compromise level of application offers too little water, 
and the crops dry out, reducing yields. Aggregating 
over the growing season, water is less wasted and 
potential yields are sacrificed. 
 
A precision irrigation technology addresses this 
problem by allowing the grower to tailor water 
application to the appropriate amount for each day. In 
this way, a precision system can simultaneously improve 
water efficiency and increase yields.  Caswell and 
Zilberman (1986) use the concept of irrigation efficiency 
to model this process. In their framework, production (y) 
is a function of effective water  (xe) which is the water 
actually absorbed by the plant, so y = f (xe). This is in 
contrast to the applied water (x) which is the amount 
applied to the field over the growing season.  Irrigation 
efficiency (a) is defined as the ratio of effective water to 
applied water, or a = xe/x. Low precision technologies, 
such as furrow irrigation, have efficiencies of about 60 
percent while high precision technologies, such as 
computer controlled drip systems, can have efficiencies 
of above 90 percent.  
 
These technologies are information intensive. Gains 
cannot be realized if the grower does not have 
information on the changing daily water requirements of 
the crops. Therefore irrigation efficiency is a function of 
the information quality, the precision of the application 
technology and the heterogeneity of the production 
sub-units (Osgood, 1999).  Micro unit variability (s) is a 
measure of the heterogeneity of the production sub-
units. There is locational variability of the dynamic of 
depletion of soil moisture and soil capacity to store 
water for absorption by the plants.  Depletions in soil 
moisture are driven by temporal variations in ET, filtered 
by the water holding capacity of the soil and crop 
properties. High micro unit variability lowers irrigation 
efficiency as sub optimal amounts of water are applied 
on each micro unit (day). Using weather information and 
precision irrigation technologies, a grower can counter 
the negative effects of high micro unit variability. 
Therefore the benefit of these technologies is highest 
when there is a great deal of micro unit variability and 
diminishes for those facing low levels of variation. 
Because farms have different weather, crop, and soil 
characteristics, micro unit variability changes from farm 
to farm. The benefits of precision technologies therefore 
vary depending on farm characteristics.  
 
Increasing the quality of daily ET information improves 
irrigation efficiency yielding an intensive (production 
based) effect on water use.  Obviously, this effect is 
most pronounced for growers who have substantial 
micro unit variability and who are using precision 
irrigation systems (Osgood, 1999). Because 
improvements in daily ET information increase irrigation 
efficiency more for high precision systems than for low 
precision systems, information improvements make 
precision irrigation systems more attractive in terms of 
profits from increased yields and water savings. This 
provides the extensive effect:  It is an incentive for the 
adoption of efficient irrigation systems.  
 
The threshold adoption framework of David (1975) 
clearly represents the incentives behind this process. 
Assume a population of growers with heterogeneous 
levels of micro unit variability, and a choice of upgrading 
from a low precision irrigation technology (A1) to a 
higher precision technology (A2) at a given level of ET 
information quality (I). It is worthwhile to invest in the 
higher precision technology if its yield and water 
savings benefits exceed the investment cost of the 
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technology. Equation 1 represents the adoption 
threshold and implicitly determines s*  , the threshold 
micro unit variability of adoption.  At levels of micro unit 
variability above the threshold it is worthwhile to invest 
in the new technology, while at lower levels it is not 
worthwhile to adopt.  
[Pxyf(aA2,I,s* x2*) – Pxx2*] – [Pxyf(aA2,I,s* x1*) – Pxx1*] = C                                                               
(1)  
 
Adoption is mapped to the population by observing the 
distribution of individual micro unit variability, as in 
Figure 1.  If the solid line illustrates the threshold micro 
unit variability at which it is worthwhile to adopt, the 
population right of the solid line would adopt while the 
population to the left of the line would not. Increasing 
the information quality improves the efficiency gain of 
higher precision technologies and therefore shifts the 
threshold to the left to the dashed line. The integral of 
the population density between the two lines represents 
the group of new adopters and illustrates the adoption 
impact of providing subsidized weather information.  
 
 
 
 
Figure: 1 Adoption Threshold 
 
 
This shift can be accomplished through other 
incentives. Increasing the marginal price of water or of 
the agricultural output leads to improvements in the 
profit differential, shifting the threshold micro unit 
variability to the left and increasing adoption. Because 
the investment cost includes the cost of physical 
infrastructure as well as the human capital investment of 
learning how to produce using the new system, 
adoption can also be influenced by reducing the 
learning costs through education and outreach (Wolf & 
Nowack, 1994).  
 
The market failures associated with the pirating of 
information, prevented private sector from providing 
that type of product, leaving the government to fill that 
role. From a policy perspective, the ease of spread of 
information was found to be an advantage.   The more 
information “pirating” that occurs, the more successful 
the program.  Not imposing users fees is optimal from a 
social prospective.  The wider the spread of the 
information, the greater the incentives for conservation. 
 
Because there are two market failures, the cost of waste 
and public good problems leading to the under 
provision of information, market forces will lead to 
optimal adoption and use of precision systems only if 
the true shadow value of water is faced by growers and 
if there are no market failures associated with 
information. Thus, even if California growers faced 
appropriate prices for water, there would be inefficient 
water use from the market failures due to the public good 
characteristics of weather information.  Therefore there 
is a government role in providing growers with weather 
information. In addition, Osgood (1999) showed that if 
prices did not accurately reflect the scarcity value of 
water, an information “super-subsidy”  (provision of 
weather information exceeding that necessary to 
counteract the public good market failures) is an 
effective tool to improve conservation.   
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Weather information allows growers to take advantage 
of the flexibility of conservation technologies to respond 
to changes in water needs over time, saving water on 
some days and increasing yields on others.   Therefore, 
information provides more yield and water savings 
benefits to conservation technologies than to lower 
precision, less flexible irrigation systems. This causes 
conservation technologies to be relatively more 
profitable and their adoption worthwhile for a larger 
segment of the population.   
 
The groups that will take advantage of these 
technologies will be those who have high value crops 
and high water costs resulting in relatively higher 
potential profit increases. Because the gains arise from 
an ability to adapt water applications to heterogeneous 
micro unit demands, growers who face higher variation 
due to weather, crop, or soil characteristics are also more 
likely to invest in conservation technologies. In 
addition, unexpected groups may be affected by the 
program. Information programs have a spillover potential 
leading to unanticipated benefits and conservation far 
beyond the original mandates of regulatory agencies.  
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Even with weather information provision, constraints 
preventing efficient water markets or scarcity pricing of 
water continue to reduce incentives for adoption.  In 
Parker et al. (1996), it was noted that the biggest 
dis incentive for the adoption of precision technologies 
was low water prices. However, information programs 
increase the responsiveness of growers to react to other 
incentives as they evolve, either through gradual policy 
change or because of a crisis.  Therefore, they provide 
an important policy tool to compliment the pricing 
mechanisms that are or may become available.  
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